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WHAT LURKS BENEATH:
NSA SURVEILLANCE AND EXECUTIVE POWER
GARY LAWSON*
It is not surprising that, nearly two and a quarter centuries after ratification
of the Federal Constitution, people are still actively arguing about the extent of
the American President's powers.' The concept of executive power is
notoriously murky,2 so disputes about its scope and character are virtually
unavoidable. It is, however, at least a tad surprising that, nearly two and a
quarter centuries after ratification of the Federal Constitution, people are still
arguing about the constitutional sources of presidential power. 3 It is one thing
to disagree about how far the President's power extends, but it is quite another
thing to disagree about which words of the Constitution are relevant to that
inquiry. It is actually quite remarkable that the United States could function
for more than 200 years without agreement on something as basic as the
correct provisions of the Constitution to read in determining the extent of the
powers of one of the federal government's great institutions. Nonetheless, the
dispute about the proper grounding for presidential power is one of the most
fundamental and long-lived disputes in American constitutional law.
Nor is this dispute purely academic. The real-world stakes of identifying the
proper locus (or loci) of presidential power are staggering. To illustrate those
stakes, to show just how deeply and profoundly opinion is divided on this
issue, and to suggest the proper resolution to the conflict, I want to focus on a
relatively recent set of events involving electronic surveillance of suspected
terrorists as a case study in the causes and consequences of constitutional
confusion.
* Professor, Boston University School of Law. I am grateful to the Abraham and Lillian
Benton Fund for support.
' See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive,
48 ARK. L. REV. 23, 27-28 (1995).
2 See Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional
Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1283-84 (1996).
3 Compare Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and
Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545, 551 (2004), with Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael
D. Ramsey, Foreign Affairs and the Jeffersonian Executive: A Defense, 89 MINN. L. REV.
1591, 1595 (2005).
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My basic contention is that the President's constitutional power4 stems
entirely from two provisions in the Constitution: the provision in Article 1,
Section 7 which gives the President the presentment and veto power 5 and the
first sentence of Article II, Section 1 which states that "[t]he executive Power
shall be vested in a President of the United States of America."' 6 The second
half of this statement is the eye of the storm. No one doubts that the
Presentment Clause is a grant of power to the President, but the idea that the
President draws power from the "Vesting Clause" of Article II rather than from
the specific enumerations of presidential functions in Sections 2 and 3 of
Article II - an idea that will henceforth be called "the Article II Vesting Clause
thesis' 7 - is one of the most hotly debated propositions in modem
constitutional law.
8
The debate turns out to be remarkably one-sided upon careful consideration:
the Vesting Clause grants power to the President beyond a reasonable doubt.
To be sure, there are plenty of reasonable doubts about the scope and character
of the power granted to the President by the Article II Vesting Clause, but the
proposition that the Constitution itself grants something called "[t]he executive
Power"9 to the President is a slam dunk as a matter of textual, linguistic,
intratextual, and structural analysis.
Once the Article II Vesting Clause is seen as a grant of power, the proper
framework for evaluating the legality of presidentially-ordered surveillance of
foreign communications becomes clear. Without the Article II Vesting Clause
thesis, the case for the legality of the current surveillance program is dicey at
best. With the Article II Vesting Clause thesis, the case for the legality of the
program, while not unanswerable, is very strong, at least as a matter of original
constitutional meaning.' 0 Accordingly, the Article II Vesting Clause thesis
should be front and center in any discussion of the National Security Agency
("NSA") surveillance controversy for which the original meaning of the
Constitution is deemed relevant.
4 Statutes, of course, can also be an important source of presidential power. See Kevin
M. Stack, The President's Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. L. REv.
263, 264 (2006). My focus in this Essay, however, is on presidential powers that come
directly from the Constitution itself.
5 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
6 Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. This shall henceforth be referred to as the "Vesting Clause."
I A similar argument applies to the Vesting Clause at the beginning of Article III, which
states that "[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court,
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 1.
' See supra note 3; see also infra text accompanying notes 59-66.
9 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
10 Whether it is weak or strong as a matter of contemporary doctrine, which is at least
five degrees of separation removed from any plausible account of original meaning, is
another question for another time and another scholar.
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I
In the wake of the terrorist acts of war of September 11, 2001,11 the Bush
Administration, through the NSA, began a program of intercepting electronic
communications between persons inside and outside of the United States when
at least one party to the conversation was suspected of having terrorist
connections.12 On at least some occasions, the electronic eavesdropping was
concededly performed without following the procedures specified on the face
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 ("FISA"), 13 which
generally requires the Executive Department to obtain a warrant from a special
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court before intercepting foreign electronic
communications.1 4 From where, if anywhere, did the President of the United
States get the legal authority to authorize this program?
" Many people dispute that the current struggle against radical Islamists can properly be
characterized as a war. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Terrorism and the Constitutional Order,
75 FORDHAM L. REV. 475, 477-81 (2006). To the best of my knowledge, that class of
disputants does not include anyone who is a radical Islamist engaged in the struggle. While
we cannot ask the 9/11 bombers whether they regarded their mission as an act of war, the
conduct of individuals and organizations allied with them both before and after 9/11 gives
every indication of the kind of coordinated and sustained assault on the United States to
which the label "war" can appropriately be given. If the shoe-bomber fits .... See JOHN
Yoo, WAR BY OTHER MEANS 1-8 (2006). Nor is it relevant for domestic constitutional
purposes that Congress has not formally declared war. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11
(giving Congress power "[t]o declare War"). A declaration, as the word suggests,
recognizes a state of affairs that exists independently of the declaration. See John C. Yoo,
The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers,
84 CAL. L. REV. 167, 207-08 (1996). If a terrorist nation rained nuclear destruction on
twenty American cities, a state of war would exist even if Congress had not gotten around to
declaring it. Similarly, if a terrorist organization rained conventional destruction on two
American cities (and, thanks to some heroic ordinary Americans, one empty field), a state of
war would exist whether or not members of Congress, or of elite academic institutions,
chose to recognize it.
12 At least, that is the aspect of the monitoring program for which there has been public
acknowledgment. See President George W. Bush, President's Radio Address on Homeland
Security (Dec. 17, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news
/releases/2005/12/20051217.html (acknowledging that he "authorized the National Security
Agency... to intercept the international communications of people with known links to al
Qaeda and related terrorist organizations"). It is possible that actual NSA monitoring
extends beyond the acknowledged limits. I doubt whether the international character of a
communication matters very much to the ultimate legality of this activity, but in any event
this Essay addresses only considerations that bear on the legality of warrantless electronic
surveillance of transmissions into or out of the United States where at least one party to the
communication is reasonably suspected to be an enemy of the United States.
13 Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-
1871 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)).
14 50 U.S.C. §§ 1803-1805 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004). There are exceptions to this
requirement, but no one claims that those exceptions cover all, or even most, of the activities
20081
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW RE VIE W
It matters very much how one answers this question. According to FISA, it
is a federal criminal offense to engage in foreign intelligence surveillance
under color of law without statutory authorization or a judicial warrant.15 Let
us stipulate that at least some of the activities authorized by the Bush
Administration fall outside of FISA's enumerated authorizations and
exceptions. In that case, without some source of legal authorization beyond
FISA itself, numerous officials in the Bush Administration, including the
President, seem to have committed criminal and impeachable offenses. On the
other hand, if the President in time of war does have authority to monitor the
conversations of suspected enemies and fails to exercise it, that inaction would,
in my humble judgment, constitute the impeachable offense of neglect or
dereliction of duty.' 6 As I said, finding the right answer matters. And there
are at least five possible right answers.
One possibility is that the President has no such authority, in which case
impeachment proceedings are probably an appropriate next step. That is a
conclusion, however, that one ought to reach only after examining all possible
sources of authority.
A second possibility is that the President has statutory authority to order
wiretaps outside the scope of FISA in at least some circumstances. FISA
specifically provides that its seemingly exclusive procedures do not govern
electronic surveillance that is otherwise "authorized by statute."' 7  On
September 18, 2001, Congress authorized the President to:
use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed,
or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or
harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts
under the NSA surveillance program. See id. §§ 1802(a)(1), 1804(f); see also Press Briefing
by Alberto Gonzales, Attorney General, and General Michael Hayden, Principal Deputy
Director of National Intelligence (Dec. 19, 2005), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051219-1.html ("We understand that
[the NSA surveillance program] is a more - I'll use the word 'aggressive' program than
would traditionally be available under FISA." (quoting General Hayden)); John Yoo, The
Terrorist Surveillance Program and the Constitution, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 565, 565
(2007). For an overview of FISA, see Memorandum, Elizabeth B. Bazan & Jennifer K.
Elsea, Presidential Auth. to Conduct Warrantless Electronic Surveillance to Gather Foreign
Intelligence Information, Cong. Research Serv. 17-27 (Jan. 5, 2006) [hereinafter CRS
Memo].
'5 See 50 U.S.C. § 1809 (2000).
16 This is a relatively broad (though far from unprecedented) view of the range of
impeachable offenses, see Lawson & Moore, supra note 2, at 1307-09, but even if I am
wrong that failure to pursue lawful measures to monitor terrorists is impeachable, it would
certainly be grossly irresponsible.
17 50 U.S.C. § 1809(a).
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of international terrorism against the United States by such nations,
organizations or persons. 18
Perhaps that Authorization for Use of Military Force ("AUMF") is all the
authorization required for the NSA surveillance program.' 9
Perhaps this is the case, but perhaps the words "all necessary and
appropriate force" do not refer to all possible activities aimed at combating
international terror networks but instead refer only to a narrower range of
traditional military activities. The language of the AUMF can certainly be read
to cover intelligence gathering, electronic or otherwise, on battlefields, on the
reasonable assumption that "necessary and appropriate force" refers to the
traditional incidents of war, including supplying troops with weapons,
supplies, and information.20 It does not inexorably follow, however, that it
also includes the monitoring of non-battlefield communications, no more than
it necessarily includes operating commercial radio or television stations in
neutral foreign countries to win over hearts and minds, even if that would be an
effective tool in the war.21 It is true that the war against radical Islamists does
not have well-defined geographical boundaries, so that "[a]ll the world's a
stage" 22 for the conflict. But that cannot possibly mean (can it?) that any
action that could lawfully be taken in a location involving actual, active
hostilities can be taken anywhere in the world under the AUMF. Nor does it
logically follow from the geographically and temporally boundless language of
the AUMF that it contemplates authorization for all steps leading up to the use
of "necessary and appropriate force" in addition to the necessary and
appropriate force itself Once the President identifies "those nations,
organizations, or persons... [who] planned, authorized, committed, or aided
the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such
organizations or persons,"2 3 the AUMF sweeps very broadly, but it does not
necessarily authorize all possible mechanisms for making that initial
identification. The argument that Congress authorized the NSA surveillance
program seems like a bit (if only a bit) of a stretch. In any event, it makes for a
more interesting conversation to assume that the AUMF does not - or at least
does not without a very strong dose of the constitutional avoidance doctrine -
constitute statutory authorization for the NSA wiretapping program.
11 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40 § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224
(2001) [hereinafter AUMF].
19 Some very smart people so believe. See Yoo, supra note 11, at 115-18; U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National Security Agency
Described by the President 23-28 (Jan. 19, 2006) [hereinafter DOJ Memo].
20 Yoo, supra note 14, at 587 n.159.
21 Cf Curtis Bradley et al., On NSA Spying: A Letter to Congress, 53 N.Y. REV. OF
BOOKS, Feb. 9, 2006, at 42, 43, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/18650.
22 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, As You LIKE IT act 2, sc. 7, 1. 139.
23 AUMF, Pub. L. No. 107-40 § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001).
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A third possibility is that the President gets the power to authorize the NSA
wiretaps from the evident enumerations of presidential power in Sections 2 and
3 of Article II. Those provisions read:
Section 2
The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the
United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the
actual Service of the United States; he may require the Opinion, in
writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments,
upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he
shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the
United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.
He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and
he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of
the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be
established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment
of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in
the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen
during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall
expire at the End of their next Session.
Section 3
He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State
of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he
shall judge necessary and expedient; he may, on extraordinary Occasions,
convene both Houses, or either of them, and in Case of Disagreement
between them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn
them to such Time as he shall think proper; he shall receive Ambassadors
and other public Ministers; he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed, and shall Commission all the Officers of the United States.24
Obviously, the power to commission officers, to request the opinion in
writing from principal officers on matters related to their duties, or to pick the
time for adjournment of Congress when the House and Senate cannot agree
won't cut it, but what about the first sentence of Article II, Section 2, which
says that the President "shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of
the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the
actual Service of the United States"? 25 Perhaps being Commander-in-Chief
24 U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 2-3.
25 Id. art. II, §2, c.1.
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includes the power to order intelligence gathering both on and off the
battlefield, so that even if the AUMF does not authorize such activities, the
Constitution itself does so.
Perhaps, but the conclusion is a poor fit with the language of the
Commander in Chief Clause. The evident import of the clause is to establish a
chain of command rather than to define the scope of the Commander-in-
Chief s power.26 To be "Commander in Chief' is to be the top general - the
person who makes ultimate strategic and tactical decisions. That designation
assures civilian control of the military 27 and prevents Congress from trying to
leverage its numerous enumerated war powers into a power to direct troop
movements, 28 but it does not seem to speak directly to the extent or scope of
presidential power beyond the field of battle. Does the President's status as
Commander-in-Chief, for instance, authorize him or her to seize steel mills to
ensure continued production of necessary military supplies? The Supreme
Court has famously said no, 29 and while that may be prima facie grounds to
believe otherwise, just like a stopped clock, even the Supreme Court can
stumble into the right answer on occasion. 30 In this case, I think that they did
get it right, though not necessarily for the right reasons or with the best
explanation. 3' Suppose that the military officer directly below the President -
the Commander-in-Almost-But-Not-Quite-Chief of the Armed Forces -
decided that a looming labor strike in the steel industry would threaten a war
effort. Could he or she, without statutory authorization, seize and run the steel
26 Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, International Law and Constitutional Interpretation: The
Commander in Chief Clause Reconsidered, 106 MICH. L. REV. 61, 83 (2007). But see Yoo,
supra note 14, at 569.
27 See David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowet
Ebb - Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARv. L. REV.
689, 792-93 (2008).
28 See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Jeffersonian Treaty Clause, 2006 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1, 29-30 [hereafter Lawson & Seidman, Treaty Clause].
29 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952).
30 The standard tendency in the legal academy is to treat Supreme Court decisions as
privileged pronouncements on constitutional meaning. It is a very, very bad tendency.
There is nothing in the Constitution on which to ground any such idea, nor does the
Supreme Court's actual track record as a constitutional interpreter inspire much confidence.
As a matter of realpolitick, Supreme Court opinions matter, just as decisions of presidents,
congresspersons, and state and local officials matter. Ignore them and you risk getting shot
by federal marshals. But as a matter of objective constitutional meaning, there is no good
reason to think that Supreme Court opinions are better evidence of that meaning than are the
pronouncements of the Department of Justice, the Congressional Research Service, or Gary
Lawson - and there are good reasons to think them worse.
31 Justice Jackson's famous concurrence, which has acquired near-canonical status in
some circles, see Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers,
119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2314-15 (2006), was a particularly unhelpful bit of twaddle, but
that is a topic for another day.
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mills or is that a decision constitutionally committed to Congress rather than to
the military? If the answers are, respectively, "no" and "yes," then it is hard to
see how designating someone one spot ahead of that person on the
organization chart could change the outcome. The Commander in Chief
Clause reads far less like a grant of presidential power than like a specification
of decision making hierarchy, and the NSA wiretap program seems much more
like steel mill seizures than like ordering air strikes in Afghanistan. 32 And,
again, it is a more interesting conversation if we assume that to be the case, so
that the Commander in Chief Clause does not constitute direct, extra-statutory
authority for the NSA surveillance operation.
A fourth possibility is that the President has certain inherent powers that
need not be located in any particular constitutional clause. Arguments for
inherent federal powers of various kinds have been made from time to time, on
matters ranging from a power of eminent domain33 to a power to establish
military governments during times of peace,34 but anyone seriously committed
to the enterprise of constitutional interpretation must categorically reject any
arguments for inherent, unenumerated federal power. The principle of
enumerated federal power is the single most basic precept of the Federal
Constitution.35 Especially in view of the clarification provided by the Tenth
Amendment,36 arguments for unenumerated federal power should be
inadmissible in constitutional discourse. 37
So at this point the NSA wiretapping program is 0-4. But one hit will keep
it, even if just barely, above the Mendoza Line, 38 and there is one more at-bat
32 Cf Letter from Laurence H. Tribe, Professor, Harvard Univ., to Honorable John
Conyers, Jr., U.S. Congressman 3 (Jan. 6, 2006) (arguing that if the President cannot
constitutionally seize "certain critical publicly held [steel] corporations... in order to avert
the threat that would be posed to our national security .... then certainly an unchecked
presidential program of secretly recording the conversations of ... private citizens in the
United States" is likewise unconstitutional under Youngstown).
" See United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 518 (1883); Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S.
403, 406 (1878).
34 See Letter from James Buchanan, Secretary of State, to William V. Vorhies (Oct. 7,
1848), reprinted in S. Doc. No. 31-18, at 7-8 (1850). The Supreme Court upheld the
legality of peacetime military governments in Cross v. Harrison, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 164,
189-90 (1853). For a critical assessment of that episode, and of the claims of inherent
governmental authority that it spawned, see generally Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The
Hobbesian Constitution: Governing Without Authority, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 581 (2001).
31 See GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE 22-23 (2004).
36 U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people.").
37 See LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 35, at 22-23.
38 Mario Mendoza was a slick-fielding shortstop who played nine seasons in the Major
Leagues from 1974-82. He was such a miserable hitter (lifetime batting average: .215) that
it was always questionable whether he would break .200 in any given year- which he failed
[Vol. 88:375
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to go. The last possibility is that the President gets power to, among other
things, authorize intelligence gathering during wartime from the first sentence
of Article I, which states that "[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a
President of the United States of America. '39 If this sentence grants the
President a chunk of power called "executive Power," and if that power
includes the ability to gather foreign intelligence during wartime even off the
battlefield, then the Constitution itself grants the President the necessary
authority to put in motion something like the NSA wiretapping program.40
Thus, one of the most important questions of any kind, on any subject, under
the Federal Constitution is whether the first sentence of Article II grants power
to the President or whether, as opponents of the Vesting Clause thesis argue,4'
it merely designates the office of the presidency and indicates that there will be
one President rather than an executive council.
II
There is nothing remotely resembling a consensus on the Article II Vesting
Clause thesis either in the legal academy 42 or in the halls of government. 43 To
see just how deeply divisions on this question run, consider two dueling
memoranda issued in early 2006 concerning the NSA wiretapping program.
On January 19, 2006, the Department of Justice released a document entitled
"Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National Security Agency
Described by the President,"" which defended on multiple grounds the legality
of electronic eavesdropping on suspected terrorist communications into or out
of the United States. 45 The first substantive sentence in the "Analysis" section
of the document reads: "Article II of the Constitution vests in the President all
executive power of the United States, including the power to act as
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. '46 At first glance, this reads like a
straightforward assertion of the Article II Vesting Clause thesis, which would
to do on five occasions. For the past three decades, .200 has widely been known in baseball
circles as the "Mendoza Line," though I gather there is some controversy over the term's
precise origin and referent. See Mendoza Line - Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/MendozaLine (last visited Feb. 24, 2008). And yes, his fielding really was good
enough to keep him in the majors for nine seasons, including two seasons as the starting
shortstop for my beloved Seattle Mariners. See id.
39 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
40 Whether that authority can be exercised in the face of a contrary congressional statute
is discussed infra Part 111.
" See, e.g., Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 3, at 554 & n.29; Lawrence Lessig & Cass R.
Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1,47-48 (1994).
42 See infra text accompanying notes 59-66.
43 See infra text accompanying notes 44-58.
4 DOJ Memo, supra note 19.
45 Id. at 3.
46 Id. at 6.
2008]
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW
locate the President's war-making powers in the Vesting Clause rather than the
Commander in Chief Clause. After all, the sentence states that Article II grants
to the President "all executive power of the United States," which is the central
proposition of the Vesting Clause thesis.47 On that understanding, the powers
that are exercisable by the American Commander-in-Chief fall under the
category of "executive Power" and would vest in the President even without
the Commander in Chief Clause's clarification of the President's role in the
military hierarchy. But on closer examination, the phrasing of the Memo is
more ambiguous. It could also be read to suggest that whatever executive
power is vested in the President stems from the enumerations in Sections 2 and
3 of Article II. Indeed, the only constitutional provision cited in support of the
previously quoted sentence in the DOJ Memo is Article II, Section 2, which
contains the Commander in Chief Clause; there is no specific reference in that
DOJ discussion to the Vesting Clause as a source of power. 48 On the other
hand, the DOJ Memo repeatedly, and one might even say ad nauseum, refers to
"inherent" presidential power.49 It is possible that the Memo means to invoke
the specter of unenumerated power to claim that the President has certain
powers because all executives have such power simply by virtue of being
executives. But it is also possible, and considerably more plausible, to think
that the DOJ Memo used the term "inherent" to mean "constitutionally
granted." And the only constitutional grant that can support the kinds of
presidential powers discussed by the DOJ Memo, including something called
"the President's general foreign affairs powers," which has no conceivable
grounding in Sections 2 and 3 of Article I, 50 is the Article II Vesting Clause.
Indeed, the Memo expressly invokes the Vesting Clause in support of the
President's preeminent role in foreign affairs. 51 Thus, although the DOJ Memo
does not articulate the Vesting Clause thesis with clarity, it seems clear that the
Vesting Clause thesis lurks beneath the argument and provides it with
substance.5 2
41 See supra text accompanying notes 39-40.
48 See DOJ Memo, supra note 19, at 6-10.
41 See id. at 6-10, 29-31.
50 See id. at 31.
"' See id. at 30. For a detailed defense of the claim that the Article II Vesting Clause
supports at least some (though not necessarily all) of the foreign-affairs powers traditionally
claimed by presidents, see Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive
Power over Foreign Affairs, 11l YALE L.J. 231, 257 (2001). For a sustained rebuttal, which
I believe largely talks past the main line of the Prakash/Ramsey thesis, see Bradley &
Flaherty, supra note 3, at 687.
52 Why does the Memo not proudly proclaim the Vesting Clause thesis but instead
smuggle it in under cover of claims of "inherent" presidential power? The answer is surely
that, although the Article II Vesting Clause thesis is crucial for getting the right answer to
questions about the legality of the NSA program, the DOJ Memo is not really trying to get
the right answer to those questions. The Memo spends far more energy explaining how the
NSA wiretapping program is consistent with Supreme Court decisions than it does
[Vol. 88:375
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Contemporaneously with the Department of Justice memorandum, the
Congressional Research Service produced its own analysis of the NSA
surveillance program that was considerably more skeptical of presidential
authority.5 3 The two memoranda exchanged fire over the proper interpretation
of FISA and the AUMF, the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, and, of
course, the nature and extent of the President's independent constitutional
power in this area. With specific respect, however, to the Article I1 Vesting
Clause thesis, either abstractly or in its application to the NSA wiretapping
program, the CRS Memo said.., absolutely nothing.5 4 Not a word - not even
an acknowledgment that the Article II Vesting Clause is something that might
be thought, even mistakenly, to be pertinent to questions of presidential power.
A footnote in the memo 55 specifically lists the power-granting constitutional
provisions that, in the authors' view, address "the domain of foreign affairs and
war powers, both of which areas are inhabited to some degree by the President
together with the Congress. '56 The footnote identifies seven of the provisions
from Article I, Section 8 (including one that is not a grant of power at all 57) and
the Commander in Chief and Take Care Clauses from Article 11.58 There is no
mention in the footnote of the Article II Vesting Clause, meaning that the CRS
memo not only does not regard the Vesting Clause as a grant of power but does
not even consider it to be the kind of clause that a reasonable person might
think is a grant of power.
explaining how the program is consistent with the Constitution, see DOJ Memo, supra note
19, at 34, and the corpus of Supreme Court decisions is not favorable to the Vesting Clause
thesis. Indeed, Supreme Court opinions are far more favorably inclined to the idea of
unenumerated executive powers (i.e., "inherent powers" in the bad sense) than to the Article
II Vesting Clause thesis - which tells you everything that you need to know about Supreme
Court opinions. See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414 (2003).
Accordingly, if one is trying to map legal arguments onto the United States Reports rather
than onto the Constitution itself, the Vesting Clause thesis will make at most a token
appearance. (Similarly, if one is trying to map legal arguments onto the Constitution itself,
the United States Reports will make at most a token appearance.) Whether the Department
of Justice ought to be trying to outguess the Supreme Court rather than to get the right
answer is an interesting question for another day.
53 See DOJ Memo, supra note 19, at 44.
" See CRS Memo, supra note 14, at 27-33.
55 See id. at4n.11.
56 Id.
57 The Memo states that "[t]he Constitution specifically gives to Congress the power to
'provide for the common Defence."' Id. The Constitution does no such thing. The
internally-quoted language, drawn from the Taxing Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1,
identifies one of the permissible purposes for which taxes may be levied, but it is not an
independent grant of power to Congress.
58 See CRS Memo, supra note 14, at 4 n.1 1 ("The President is responsible for 'tak[ing]
Care that the Laws [are] faithfully executed,' U.S. CONST., art. II, § 3, and serves as the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, id. § 2, cl. .").
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Academic opinion is also sharply divided. The Vesting Clause thesis in its
modem form was first articulated in a path-breaking 1992 article by Steve
Calabresi and Kevin Rhodes that identified the crucial role of the Article II and
Article III Vesting Clauses in empowering the President and the federal
courts. 59 Professor Calabresi, responding to some criticisms by Michael
Froomkin, 60 then laid out the primary textual and structural considerations that
underlie the Vesting Clause thesis in an analysis that continues to be the
foundation for modem defenses of the thesis. 6' Larry Lessig and Cass
Sunstein launched the first extended assault on the Vesting Clause thesis, 62 to
which Professor Calabresi and Sai Prakash responded with equal extension. 63
Professor Prakash and Mike Ramsey applied the Vesting Clause thesis to the
foreign-affairs realm,64 which prompted a lengthy response from Curtis
Bradley and Martin Flaherty that included a reformulation of the case against
the thesis. 65 Guy Seidman and I have chimed in with detailed responses to
Bradley, Flaherty, Lessig, and Sunstein. 66 The sheer volume of literature
conducting, applying, and commenting upon this debate is enormous.
Because my views on the Vesting Clause thesis are offered in considerable
detail elsewhere, 67 I will present here only an abbreviated account of the proper
resolution of this debate. As it happens, an abbreviated account is enough,
because despite the depth and breadth of the controversy over the Vesting
Clause thesis and the extraordinary scholarly prowess of the opponents of the
thesis, it does not turn out to be a close question - at least once one properly
formulates the question. If one is looking for objective constitutional meaning,
the correct question is how the Article II Vesting Clause would have been
understood by a hypothetical reasonable observer at the time of the
Constitution's ratification. The primary tools of analysis for this inquiry are
textual, intratextual, and structural arguments; historical surveys of the actual
views of concrete individuals and of actual practices over time may be relevant
for that inquiry but are strictly secondary considerations. 68 In other words,
51 Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary
Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1215 (1992).
60 A. Michael Froomkin, The Imperial Presidency's New Vestments, 88 Nw. U. L. REV.
1346, 1373 (1994) [hereinafter Froomkin, Vestments].
61 See Steven G. Calabresi, The Vesting Clauses as Power Grants, 88 Nw. U. L. REV.
1377, 1389-90 (1994).
62 See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 41, at 118.
63 Stevcn G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the
Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 663 (1994).
6 See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 5 1, at 252-56.
65 See Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 3, at 687-88.
66 See Lawson & Seidman, Treaty Clause, supra note 28, at 22-43.
67 See id. at 34.
68 For an explication and defense of this methodology, see generally Gary Lawson &
Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 47 (2006).
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"[o]riginal understandings were not necessarily original meanings. '69 From
the standpoint of this "reasonable-person originalism," four considerations
overwhelmingly establish that the Article II Vesting Clause is a grant of "[tihe
executive Power" to the President.
First, it is tough to get around the plain language of the clause: "The
executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of
America. '70 Indeed, "[i]t is very hard to read a clause that speaks of vesting
power in a particular actor as doing anything other than vesting power in a
particular actor." 7'
Second, as Steve Calabresi has elegantly documented, the etymology of the
word "vest," with its ties to the Latin term "vestment" and its connotations of
(ecclesiastical or royal) authority, supports the view that the verb "vest"
denotes the granting of power.72 Given the founding generation's familiarity
with Latin,73 the power-granting implications of the use of the word "vest"
could not have escaped the notice of a founding-era reasonable observer.
Third, an intratextual examination of the Constitution's use of the term
"vest" seals the Vesting Clause thesis. Apart from the three Vesting Clauses,
the Constitution uses the term "vest" twice - in the Sweeping Clause 74 and the
Appointments Clause75 - and both usages unambiguously carry a power-
granting meaning. The proposition that "vest" merely designates a status
without granting power is utter gibberish in these contexts.
Fourth, a structural comparison of the Article II Vesting Clause with the
Article I and Article III Vesting Clauses confirms the Vesting Clause thesis.
Article III's Vesting Clause contains a parallel formulation to the Article II
Vesting Clause.76 If the Article III Vesting Clause does not constitute a power
grant of the "judicial Power of the United States" to the federal courts, then
there is simply no other clause in the Constitution that grants the federal courts
any power.77 If the Article III Vesting Clause serves as a grant of power, there
69 LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 35, at 12.
70 Id.
7 Lawson & Moore, supra note 2, at 1281.
72 See Calabresi, supra note 61, at 1380-81; Lawson & Moore, supra note 2, at 1281.
71 See Robert G. Natelson, The Legal Meaning of "Commerce" in the Commerce Clause,
80 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 789, 830-31 (2006).
74 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 ("The Congress shall have Power... To make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and
all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in
any Department or Officer thereof' (emphasis added)).
" Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("Congress may by law vest the Appointment of such inferior
Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads
of Departments" (emphasis added)).
76 See id. art. III, § 1, cl. 1.
71 Professor Froomkin has labored hard to try to show that the jurisdictional definitions
in Article III, Section 2 can function as grants of power. See Froomkin, Vestments, supra
note 60, at 1352-53; A. Michael Froomkin, Still Naked After All These Words, 88 Nw. U. L.
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is every reason to think that the near-identical Article II Vesting Clause serves
as a grant of power as well. 78 The case is even stronger when the Article II and
Article III Vesting Clauses are contrasted with the Article I Vesting Clause,
which vests in Congress only "[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted" rather
than all legislative powers simpliciter.79 The Article I Vesting Clause refers
the reader to power grants contained elsewhere in the Constitution, which
indicates that Congress is receiving only a subset of the conceptual category of
"legislative Powers."80  The Article II and Article III Vesting Clauses, by
contrast, grant the objects of those clauses the full scope of the conceptual
categories of executive and judicial power. 81  Article I enumerates the
individual powers of Congress. Articles II and III enumerate the powers of the
President and the federal courts in a "lump sum."
The case against the Vesting Clause thesis, from the standpoint of
reasonable-person originalism, 82 turns almost wholly on what might be called
an "argument from redundancy." A number of provisions in Sections 2 and 3
of Article II expressly take the form of power grants to the President,83 and
other provisions seem to have the import of power grants.84 Many, if not all,
of the functions described in these provisions would likely fall within the
REv. 1420, 1430 (1994). If the Article III Vesting Clause thesis was false, and the choice
was either to read the jurisdictional definitions as grants of power or to conclude that the
Constitution fails to grant any power to the federal courts, perhaps a reasonable observer
would prefer the latter construction. But the fact that Article III, Section 2 could possibly
serve as a "hail Mary" grant of power does not make it the most plausible source of the
federal courts' power.
78 See Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 59, at 1187.
79 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added); Calabresi, supra note 61, at 1395-96.
80 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
81 Lawson & Moore, supra note 2, at 1282 n.75.
82 One can build a strong case against the Vesting Clause thesis based on judicial
doctrine or the subjective intentions of specific historical individuals, but those
considerations, while admissible as evidence of constitutional meaning, become vanishingly
insignificant in the face of the overwhelming textual, intratextual, and structural case for the
thesis.
83 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (the President "shall have Power to grant Reprieves
and Pardons"); id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (the President "shall have Power, by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties"); id. art. II, § 2, cl. 3 (the President "shall have
Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate").
84 See id. art. 11, § 2, cl. 1 (the President "shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and
Navy"); id. (the President "may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in
each of the executive Departments"); id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (the President "shall nominate, and
by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint" officers); id. art. II, § 3,
cl. 1 (the President "may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both Houses, or either of
them, and in Case of Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time of
Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper"); id. (the
President "shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers").
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conceptual category of "executive Power," so if the Vesting Clause thesis is
true, these numerous provisions would all seem to be surplusage. 85
Even if it was sound, the argument from redundancy would not be enough to
crack the powerful prima facie case for the Vesting Clause thesis established
by the textual, linguistic, intratextual, and structural arguments advanced by its
defenders. But the argument from redundancy is unsound for two distinct
reasons. First, it applies equally to the only other plausible interpretation of the
Article II Vesting Clause. Opponents of the Vesting Clause thesis posit that
the Vesting Clause designates the office of the presidency.86 But, to rephrase
an argument elegantly pioneered by Professors Calabresi and Prakash,87 "an
interpretation of the Article II Vesting Clause as a designation of office is even
more flagrantly redundant than is the Vesting Clause thesis; provisions of the
Constitution other than the Article II Vesting Clause consistently refer to a
single chief executive known as the President. '88 Moreover, the enumerations
in Sections 2 and 3 of Article II are best understood, not as grants of power,
but as clarifications, qualifications, or limitations of power granted by the
Vesting Clause.89 Enumerations serve a very different purpose when the
Article containing them starts with a vesting clause that refers to powers
"herein granted" than when the relevant Article starts with a vesting clause that
grants a conceptual category of power.90
From the standpoint of reasonable-person originalism, the Vesting Clause
thesis is not merely true; it is obviously true. Of course, the Vesting Clause
thesis merely states that the first sentence of Article II grants power to the
President. It does not state how far that power extends, or more particularly
whether it extends to foreign intelligence surveillance off the battlefield. 9' One
could believe, for example, that the only power granted by the Article II
Vesting Clause is the power to execute the laws. But that is a difficult position
to defend. The contours of the executive power in the eighteenth century were
very far from precise, 92 but that does not make the category meaningless or
without content. Without engaging the issue here in depth, I am willing to rest
my case on the proposition that a hypothetical reasonable observer in 1788
would have concluded that the "executive Power" includes those things
traditionally done by executives, including various foreign-affairs functions
and specifically including traditional wartime activities. Gathering foreign
85 For the classic renditions of these arguments, see Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 5 1, at
555-57; Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 62, at 48.
86 See, e.g., Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 62, at 47-48.
87 See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 63, at 576-77.
88 Lawson & Seidman, Treaty Clause, supra note 28, at 28.
89 For a clause-by-clause analysis of Article II, Sections 2 and 3, see id. at 28-34.
90 See id. at 21.
91 See Lawson & Moore, supra note 2, at 1283.
92 Professors Bradley and Flaherty spent a good portion of a 144-page article establishing
this proposition with compelling force. See Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 51.
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intelligence during wartime is well within the most plausible construction of
executive power,93 even if taking over steel mills would not be. 94 And this is
true even if the intelligence gathering is not done on an actual battlefield.95
Imagine, for instance, if during the War of 1812, a ship carrying mail from
Lisbon was headed for an American port in which there were known British
sympathizers. If the President had reason to believe that British agents in
Lisbon were communicating with their sympathizers in the United States and
ordered interception of that mail, and some Harvard ACLU-type wearing a "no
blood for sailors" T-shirt objected that the President was exceeding his power
and needed to get a warrant or statutory authorization, I am willing to bet that a
reasonable observer in the founding era would have tossed the schlub into the
Charles River.
Does this mean that the Constitution grants the President a near-limitless
reservoir of powers, under the general label "executive Power," that could
justify a wide range of highly intrusive measures justified in the name of
national security? Take away the "near-limitless" part and the answer is
"mostly yes." The whole point of the Vesting Clause thesis is that the
Constitution grants to the President whatever falls within the conceptual
category of "executive Power. '96 But that grant of power contains its own set
of limiting principles. First, and most obviously, any power claimed by the
President must be executive power rather than something else.97 That rules out
such things as the seizure of steel mills (which the Supreme Court got right)98
or an order to federal courts to dismiss lawsuits (which the Supreme Court got
wrong).99 Second, exercises of the executive power are subject to the so-called
"principle of reasonableness," which is a fundamental principle of
administrative law - very well established in the eighteenth century - that
requires delegated implementational power to be used in a measured,
proportionate, and rights-regarding fashion. 100 Wartime may well expand the
range of executive actions that satisfies the principle of reasonableness, but it
93 See John C. Eastman, Listening to the Enemy: The President's Power to Conduct
Surveillance of Enemy Communications During Time of War, 13 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L.
49, 57 (2006); DOJ Memo, supra note 19, at 14-17.
94 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952).
95 See DOJ Memo, supra note 19, at 15.
96 See Lawson & Moore, supra note 2, at 1281-84.
97 Id.
98 See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587.
99 See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 688 (1981).
100 For a brief discussion of the principle of reasonableness, see Lawson & Seidman,
Treaty Clause, supra note 28, at 48-54. I am profoundly grateful to Guy Seidman for many
things; bringing the critical role of the principle of reasonableness to my attention is one of
them.
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does not expand it to infinity.10' If the NSA wiretapping program extended
into every communication that comes into or out of the United States, there is a
good chance that it would fail the "reasonableness" test of proportionality.0 2
But if the program actually corresponds to what the Bush Administration
claims about it,' 0 3 it is very hard to say that it exceeds the bounds of
reasonableness during wartime.10 4
If the Vesting Clause thesis is correct, the Bush Administration's NSA
program as it has been described by the Administration appears to be lawful -
and indeed mandatory if I am right that failure to conduct such surveillance
under present circumstances would be an impeachable offense. 10 5
III
The preceding Section concludes by observing that if the Vesting Clause
thesis is correct, then the NSA surveillance program "appears to be lawful."
The conclusion is qualified because there is one more step in the argument. If
the Vesting Clause thesis is right, then the President has constitutionally
granted authority to order reasonable, off-battlefield intelligence gathering.
Such authority does not require statutory authorization because it comes
directly from a constitutional grant of power. 10 6  But what if Congress
interposes a statutory prohibition? That is precisely what Congress appears to
have done in FISA. 10 7 FISA purports to specify an exclusive mechanism for
securing the kind of information sought through the NSA surveillance, unless
authorization external to FISA is provided by statute. 0 8  Can Congress
override the President's constitutionally granted power?
101 See Gary Lawson, Ordinary Powers in Extraordinary Times: Common Sense in Times
of Crisis, 87 B.U. L. REV. 289, 306-10 (2007).
102 See id. at 307.
103 See George W. Bush, President's Radio Address, supra note 12 (explaining the basic
nature of the surveillance program).
14 Many of the same considerations establish whether the program is consistent with the
Fourth Amendment, which expressly imposes a reasonableness requirement on searches and
seizures. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Critics of the NSA program often focus heavily on
the fact that many searches under the program take place without warrants. See, e.g.,
Wartime Executive Power and the National Security Agency's Surveillance Authority:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 426 (2006) (statement of
Harold Hongju Koh, Dean, Yale Law School). This focus accurately reflects the (mistaken)
view of the modem Supreme Court that warrantless searches are presumptively
unreasonable, see, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 828-30 (2002), but it has no
foundation in the Constitution, which creates no necessary connection between
reasonableness and warrants. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION 68-71 (1998).
105 See supra text accompanying note 16.
106 See supra text accompanying notes 92-104.
107 See 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a)(1) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
'08 See id.
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This question takes us far afield, and I will leave for another day the difficult
problem of determining how the constitutional powers of the Congress and the
President operate when they come into direct conflict. But a few tentative
words on the subject are appropriate (or at least irresistible).
The question whether Congress can restrict through FISA the President's
constitutionally granted power to gather intelligence during wartime is easily
answered "no" if Congress has no enumerated constitutional power to enact
FISA. It is quite possible that it does not. There is no way that FISA is a
direct exercise of any specifically enumerated power of Congress other than
the clause at the end of Article I, Section 8 that authorizes Congress "[t]o make
all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."' 10 9
There is, alas, no power, foregoing or otherwise, that FISA can plausibly be
said to carry into effect. 1 0 FISA is certainly not a statute that is "necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution" the President's executive power; one
does not carry a power into execution by restricting its use, no more than it
would be "necessary and proper for carrying into Execution" the judicial
power for Congress to require all judicial opinions to be reviewed and
approved by a special panel of Justice Department officials before they can be
issued." ' 1 Nor is FISA necessary and proper for carrying into execution any of
Congress's own enumerated powers - as a casual glance at the list of
enumerated congressional powers will demonstrate."l 2
But to make the inquiry more interesting, let us assume that Congress can
somehow gin up some enumerated power that it is plausible to view FISA as
implementing. Because the President has a constitutional obligation to "take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,"'1' 3 does that mean that the President
is obliged to obey FISA because it is a law to execute?
If FISA is a constitutional statute, the answer is yes: the President must obey
constitutional statutes. That is the basic import of the Take Care Clause.' "4
But the President does not have to (and indeed must not) obey unconstitutional
109 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
11" See id. art. I, § 8.
"'1 See Saikrishna Prakash, 91 CORNELL L. REv. 215, 232-40 (book review) (reviewing
HAROLD J. KRENT, PRESIDENTIAL POWERS (2005)).
112 Modem doctrine, of course, would find authorization for FISA in the Commerce
Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. After all, if the Commerce Clause authorizes
Congress to regulate what kind of plants one can grow in one's kitchen, see Gonzalez v.
Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 31-32 (2005), surely it authorizes Congress to regulate the channels of
electronic communication. But if the antecedent in this argument is false - and laughably
false does not begin to describe it - then the conclusion does not follow. For a careful study
of the original meaning of the term "commerce," under which it would be very difficult to
justify FISA, see Natelson, supra note 73, at 845.
"' U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
114 See id.
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statutes - no more than do (or may) the federal courts. 115 An unconstitutional
enactment is a legal nullity. 1 6 And in order to be constitutional, FISA must
not only carry into execution some federal power but must also be "necessary
and proper" for that purpose. If the President has constitutional authority to
monitor the conversations of suspected terrorists, there is a very serious
question whether it can be "necessary and proper" for Congress to try to
regulate the practice. Suppose Congress decided that presidents were granting
too many pardons under suspicious circumstances. Could Congress set up a
special Presidential Pardon Court that would have to screen all proposed
pardons and issue a "certificate of pardonability" before a lawful pardon could
issue? It will not suffice to say that the pardon power is "enumerated" while
the power to monitor suspected terrorist communications is not, because both
powers are enumerated in the same place: the Article II Vesting Clause. The
Pardons Clause is a clarification, qualification, and limitation on the previously
granted pardon power."l 7 If the President really has constitutional authority to
engage in certain conduct, it is very unclear why Congress should be allowed
to limit its exercise, much less to make its exercise turn on the approval of
other governmental actors. If the requirement that laws be "necessary and
proper" has any bite at all - and I have spent much of my professional life
arguing that it does - this is the context in which it would bare its incisors."18
If Congress has no authority to interfere with the President's constitutionally
granted powers, then FISA is the legal equivalent of a congressional
declaration of National Asparagus Week. It expresses the attitude of Congress
but has no legal effect. If the Constitution vests in the President enough power
to authorize the NSA surveillance program, Congress can say "boo, hiss" but it
cannot say "no."
115 See Lawson & Moore, supra note 2, at 1325-26.
116 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
117 See supra text accompanying notes 89-90.
118 See Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper" Scope of Federal Power: A
Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267, 272 (1993); Gary
Lawson, Discretion As Delegation: The "Proper" Understanding of the Nondelegation
Doctrine, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235, 237 (2005).
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